This book is a critical assessment of the role that information technologies have come to play in contemporary political campaigns. Philip Howard examines the evolving act of political campaigning and the changing organization of political campaigns over the last five election cycles, from 1996 to 2004. By collecting qualitative data from ethnographic immersion, surveys, and social network analysis, Howard explains how a new, hypermedia system of producing political culture has immense implications for citizenship and representation.
Given Howard’s interest in hypermedia’s impact on political culture, I find it odd that there is only scarce mention of MoveOn.org. From my perspective, the couple that started Move On.org changed the entire way that grassroots political organizing and, most importantly, fundraising is done in this country. Joan Blades and Wes Boyd, were instrumental in creating a platform that, according to Federal Election Commission filings, was able to raise more money (and consciousness) in a shorter amount of time than anyone has ever done before.
Howard argues that in order to understand the impact of hypermedia on campaigns, we need to understand the technology itself and how it differs from previous technological forms, and we also need to be able to situate this technology in the context of established institutional structures, in particular those of experienced campaign managers. Howard identifies a broad range of campaign actors, including traditional campaign managers, hired-hand techies, even academics. Howard then states the new, central role of hypermedia in campaigns as the technologies and techniques of software that gathers information about a user’s web browsing habits and relays these back to a central server for analysis. A major theme is the storage, retrieval, and automation of the vast quantities of information used to target individual voters or those split up into highly specific electoral segments. The marketplace of politics then becomes analogous to the marketplace exploited by sophisticated e-commerce where an illusion of a campaign and mobilization of opinion is conjured where none in fact exists.
I feel that this model does not suit MoveOn’s organizing and fundraising model. I consider MoveOn to be a more genuine grassroots effort, unlike the “grassroots” front organizations that Howard cites. MoveOn uses e-mail as its main conduit for communicating with members. It communicates primarily through a variation on a chain letter. Almost every e-mail MoveOn sends encourages recipients to forward it on to others who share an interest in the topic. This is how they build their membership and it provides a foundation of trust among the recruited. The MoveOn website also contains an area called the "Action Forum," which functions as an electronic discussion group. On the Action Forum, members vote on submissions and the highest ranked issues rise to the top, thereby establishing MoveOn’s priorities. Any member can propose priorities and strategies to which others can respond, and the most-supported ideas rise to the top. That means ceding control over much of the content to motivated online participants, producing interactivity that adds grassroots credibility.
MoveOn's fundraising success is also understated in Howard’s text. Their strategy reflects a successful adaptation to changes in federal election laws. Under the terms of the McCain/Feingold election finance reform legislation, which went into effect in 2002, political parties were allowed to raise larger amounts of "hard money" contributions, but were forbidden from raising "soft money" — a change that tended to favor Republicans, who have historically been more successful than Democrats at raising hard money. As a result, individuals who sought to influence the 2004 election gave money to non-party organizations like MoveOn, which are still able to engage in political advertising using soft money under section 527 of U.S. tax code. MoveOn was perhaps most successful at adapting to this new era of issue and candidate campaign financing, as they succefully solicited soft money from millions of members to push issues and candidates supported by genuine grassroots efforts. MoveOn’s unsurpassed ability to adapt to this new campaign climate and bring governance to the average citizen makes Joan Blades and Wes Boyd deserving, in my opinion, of the Manship Prize for Exemplary Use of the Internet in Political Communication. This prize would honor these political entrepreneurs who utilized the Internet in creative and groundbreaking ways that enhances communication among candidates, campaigns and the public.
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That first paper attached as a comment had some typos. I corrected them and deleted the first paper.
This book is a critical assessment of the role that information technologies have come to play in contemporary political campaigns. Philip Howard examines the evolving act of political campaigning and the changing organization of political campaigns over the last five election cycles, from 1996 to 2004. By collecting qualitative data from
ethnographic immersion, surveys, and social network analysis, Howard explains how a new, hypermedia system of producing political culture has immense implications for citizenship and representation.
Given Howard’s interest in hypermedia’s impact on political culture, I find it odd that there is only scarce mention of MoveOn.org. From my perspective, the couple that started Move On.org changed the entire way that grassroots political organizing and, most importantly, fundraising is done in this country. Joan Blades and Wes Boyd, were instrumental in creating a platform that, according to Federal Election Commission filings, was able to raise more money (and consciousness) in a shorter amount of time than anyone has ever done before.
Howard argues that in order to understand the impact of hypermedia on campaigns, we need to understand the technology itself and how it differs from previous technological forms, and we also need to be able to situate this technology in the context of established institutional structures, in particular those of experienced campaign managers. Howard identifies a broad range of campaign actors, including traditional campaign managers, hired-hand techies, even academics. Howard then states the new, central role of hypermedia in campaigns as the technologies and techniques of software that gathers information about a user’s web browsing habits and relays these back to a central server for analysis. A major theme is the storage, retrieval, and automation of the vast quantities of information used to target individual voters or those split up into highly specific electoral segments. The marketplace of politics then becomes analogous to the marketplace exploited by sophisticated e-commerce where an illusion of a campaign and mobilization of opinion is conjured where none in fact exists.
I feel that this model does not suit MoveOn’s organizing and fundraising model. I consider MoveOn to be a more genuine grassroots effort, unlike the “grassroots” front organizations that Howard cites. MoveOn uses e-mail as its main conduit for communicating with members. It communicates primarily through a variation on a chain letter. Almost every e-mail MoveOn sends encourages recipients to forward it on to others who share an interest in the topic. This is how they build their membership and it provides a foundation of trust among the recruited. The MoveOn website also contains an area called the "Action Forum," which functions as an electronic discussion group. On the Action Forum, members vote on submissions and the highest ranked issues rise to the top, thereby establishing MoveOn’s priorities. Any member can propose priorities and strategies to which others can respond, and the most-supported ideas rise to the top. That means ceding control over much of the content to motivated online participants, producing interactivity that adds grassroots credibility.
MoveOn's fundraising success is also understated in Howard’s text. Their strategy reflects a successful adaptation to changes in federal election laws. Under the terms of the McCain/Feingold election finance reform legislation, which went into effect in 2002, political parties were allowed to raise larger amounts of "hard money" contributions, but were forbidden from raising "soft money" — a change that tended to favor Republicans, who have historically been more successful than Democrats at raising hard money. As a result, individuals who sought to influence the 2004 election gave money to non-party organizations like MoveOn, which are still able to engage in political advertising using soft money under section 527 of U.S. tax code. MoveOn was perhaps most successful at adapting to this new era of issue and candidate campaign financing, as they succefully solicited soft money from millions of members to push issues and candidates supported by genuine grassroots efforts. MoveOn’s unsurpassed ability to adapt to this new campaign climate and bring governance to the average citizen makes Joan Blades and Wes Boyd deserving, in my opinion, of the Manship Prize for Exemplary Use of the Internet in Political Communication. This prize would honor these political entrepreneurs who utilized the Internet in creative and groundbreaking ways that enhances communication among candidates, campaigns and the public.
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